

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 RANGOO 00329 01 OF 02 100513Z

17

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

----- 089292

R 100400Z FEB 75

FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9132

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 RANGOON 0329

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS: SNAR, BM, TH

SUBJECT: NARCOTICS - NEW SHAN PROPOSAL

REF: (A) BANGKOK 2001; (B) RANGOON 197

1. SUMMARY: COWELL'S LATEST PROPOSAL (REF A), WHILE SUFFICIENTLY LESS GROTESQUE THAN EARLIER ONES TO MERIT SOME FURTHER EXPLORATION CONTAINS MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND INCONSISTENCIES WITH USG POLICIES. WE WOULD LIKE TO STUDY TEXT OF PROPOSAL AS SOON AS A COPY IS AVAILABLE TO DEPT; IN MEANTIME WE HAVE IDENTIFIED SEVERAL ASPECTS OF PROPOSAL WHICH OUGHT TO BE CLEARED UP IF THIS IS NOT DONE BY FULL TEXT. AFTER WE (AND THE DEPARTMENT) HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL IN DETAIL, I RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO TELL THE GUB ABOUT THE PROPOSAL, SIMULTANEOUSLY ASSURING GUB THAT USG WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO REJECT IT, UNLESS GUB SEES SOME WAY IN WHICH THE SUA/SSA APPROACH COULD BE TURNED TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE BY ENCOURAGING A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN DISSIDENTS AND GUB. END SUMMARY.

2. AS COMPARED TO EARLIER SSA PROPOSALS, COWELL'S LATEST PLAN SEEMS TO US TO REPRESENT SOME ADVANTAGE. IT RECOGNIZES THAT CONCRETE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE TRAFFICKERS WOULD BE A PRE-REQUISITE FOR UG EXPENDITURES OR ACTIONS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE ASSOCIATION OF SUA AND HYPOTHETICALLY THE KIA WITH THE SCHEME

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 RANGOO 00329 01 OF 02 100513Z

REPRESENTS, AS POINTED OUT REFTTEL, A CONSIDERABLY MORE VIABLE

FORCE THAN SSA AND ITS NEGLIGIBLE ALLIES. AT SAME TIME, THE PROPOSAL IS STILL OPEN TO SEVERAL SERIOUS OBJECTIONS, NOTABLY ITS FAILURE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE REACTIONS OF STRONGEST SINGLE FORCE IN SHAN STATE, THE GUB.

3. LIMITED AS ARE THE CAPABILITIES OF GUB FORCES IN THE SHAN STATE, THEY STILL EXCEED THOSE OF ANY EXISTING OR HYPOTHETICALLY TRAFFICKING GROUP. RECOGNIZING THIS, WE HAVE CONCLUDED AND UNFDAC IS NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS WITH THE GUB ON PROGRAMS WHICH WILL FURTHER STRENGTHEN ITS CAPABILITIES, NOTABLY BY THE DELIVERY OF HELICOPTERS AND THE PROVISION OF NECESSARY INPUTS FOR A CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM. AT PRESENT, NOTWITHSTANDING HEAVY BCP MILITARY PRESSURE IN NORTH AND EAST, TWO BURMA ARMY COLUMNS ARE OPERATING AGAINST TRAFFICKERS IN THE SOUTHERN SHAN STATE, AND HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN DISRUPTING CARAVANS.

4. COWELL'S PLAN IS THAT WE SHOULD INSTEAD INVEST AT LEAST \$15-20 MILLION A YEAR, FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, IN SUPPORTING A LOOSE ALLIANCE OF INSURGENT GROUPS, WHO ARE NOW REALISTIC ENOUGH TO CONCEDE THAT A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF OPIUM WOULD STILL FIND ITS WAY PAST THEM. SINCE IT MAKES NO SENSE TO FINANCE BOTH THE COPS AND THE ROBBERS, THE IMPLICATION IS THAT WE WOULD RENEGE ON OUR COMMITMENT TO GUB AND CALL INTO QUESTION THAT ANTI-NARCOTICS ACTION WHICH IT IS CURRENTLY TAKING. BEFORE CONSIDERING ANY SUCH STEPS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE GIVE THE MOST CAREFUL SCRUTINY TO THE CAPABILITIES AND FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION OF THE ROBBERS.

5. TO BEGIN WITH, COWELL'S PLAN AS SUMMARIZED REF A CONTAINS SEVERAL IMPORTANT OMISSIONS OR UNANSWERED QUESTIONS. UNLESS THESE ARE CLARIFIED BY THE FULL TEXT, CONGRESSMAN WOLFF, IF HE IS WILLING TO COOPERATE, COULD USEFULLY QUESTION COWELL CLOSELY ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: (A) WHAT PRECISELY IS HIS BASIS FOR ASSERTING THAT THE KIA WILL "BE BROUGHT INTO THE AGREEMENT AT A LATER DATE"? WHAT GUARANTEE CAN HE AND SUA GIVE US AS TO KIA COOPERATION? FYI IT SEEMS TO US NOT UNLIKELY THAT KIA WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SUCH A SCHEME. END FYI. (B) EXACTLY WHAT AREAS DO SUA AND SSA CLAIM AS "UNDER THEIR CONTROL" OR "AREAS OF OPERATION"? WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO CONCEPTS? TO WHAT EXTENT DO THESE AREAS CHANGE? WOULD SUA/SSA GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF ANY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS? AS TOKEN OF SERIOUS PUR-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 RANGOO 00329 01 OF 02 100513Z

POSE, WOULD THEY BE PREPARED PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF ANY AGREEMENT TO ESCORT OUTSIDE OBSERVERS (PROBABLY NON-U.S.) TO SPECIFIED POINTS INCLUDING LOCATIONS OF KNOWN OR SUSPECTED REFINERIES? (C) OVER HOW LONG A PERIOD OF TIME WOULD THIS PREEMPTIVE BUYING BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE? HOW MUCH "BASIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH" WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CROP SUBSTITUTE PROGRAM? (D) EXACTLY WHAT KIND OF U.S. ASSISTANCE" DO THEY HAVE IN MIND IN ENFORCING THEIR BAN ON THE OPIUM "BLACK MARKET"? (E)

FROM AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, PROBABLY ONE-HALF OF OPIUM CROP IS CONTROLLED NEITHER BY SSA/SUA/KIA NOR GUB. HOW WOULD COWELL'S FRIENDS PROPOSE TO CONTROL THAT MOVED OR GROWN IN AREAS CONTROLLED BY BCP AND CIF/SURA? IF THE U.S. OR SOME OTHER OUTSIDE ELEMENT WERE TO BUY OPIUM ALONG LINES OF COWELL'S PLAN, WHAT WORKABLE PROPOSALS WOULD SUA/SSA BE PREPARED TO MAKE FOR COOPERATION OR A SETTLEMENT WITH GUB? IN SHORT, WHAT WOULD THEY DO TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO BUY OUR WAY INTO A NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM INSTEAD OF A CIVIL WAR?

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 RANGOO 00329 02 OF 02 100523Z

20

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

----- 089343

R 100400Z FEB 75

FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9133

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 RANGOON 0329

EXDIS

6. AS THE FINAL QUESTION ABOVE SUGGEST, WE SEE A FAINT POSSIBILITY THAT COWELL'S PROPOSAL COULD BE VIABLE IF IT COULD BE ADAPTED INTO A FORM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN MERCENARY DISSIDENTS ---NOTABLY THE SUA AND GUB. IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO EITHER PARTY, BUT THERE ARE AT LEAST A FEW FACTORS WHICH MIGHT LEAD BOTH TO CONSIDER SUCH A SETTLEMENT. ON THE SUA/SSA SIDE, THERE IS THE EFFECT OF QUARRELS AMONG TRAFFICKERS AND OF BURMESE SUPPRESSION EFFORTS (REF A PARA 10); MOREOVER, IF SUA IS WILLING FOR A FINANCIAL INDUCEMENT TO LIMIT ITS TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES, IT MIGHT BE PREPARED ALSO, FOR A CONSIDERATION, TO BE BOUGHT OVER BY GUB.

7. WHEN WE HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY COWELL'S PROPOSAL AS WELL, HOPEFULLY, AS THE DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO IT, I SHALL WISH TO DISCUSS IT WITH GUB, CONTINUING OUR PRACTICE (REF B) OF KEEPING GUB INFORMED OF CONGRESSMAN WOLFF'S ACTIVITIES. IT WOULD

HARDLY BE POSSIBLE, CONSISTENT WITH ANY NORMAL CONCEPT OF FRIEND-
LY RELATIONS, TO TELL THE GUB OF THE APPROACH WITHOUT SIMULTAN-
EOUSLY DISASSOCIATING THE USG FROM IT. UNLESS, THAT IS, WE
MIGHT PLAUSIBLY REPRESENT THE PROPOSAL AS RECONCILABLE WITH GUB
INTERESTS. FORTUNATELY, IT WOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DO DO.
THERE IS IN FACT AT LEAST A REMOTE POSSIBILITY THAT THE INCREASING
PRESSURE FROM THE BCP, THE GROWING ECONOMIC STRAIN OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS AGAINST INSURGENT GROUPS, AND THE CHAOTIC SITUATION IN
SHAN STATE, MIGHT LEAD GUB TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLE-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 RANGOO 00329 02 OF 02 100523Z

MENT WHICH WOULD GIVE IT AT LEAST TEMPORARY SUPPORT OF CHANGI
SHU-CH'UAN AND HIS SUA BRIGANDS.

8. ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD APPRECIATE A COPY OF THE LATEST
COWELL PROPOSAL AS SOON AS AVAILABLE, TOGETHER WITH THE DEPART-
MENT'S VIEWS AND ANY FURTHER COMMENTS WHICH EMBASSY BANGKOK MAY
HAVE. AT SAME TIME, REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS TO DISCUSS PROPOSAL
WITH GUB AS OUTLINED ABOVE.
OSBORN

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DRUG CONTROL, PROGRAMS (PROJECTS), FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975RANGOO00329
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X2
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750047-0598
From: RANGOON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750257/aaaabzbk.tel
Line Count: 193
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 75 BANGKOK 2001, 75 RANGOON 197
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 JUL 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <12 NOV 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NARCOTICS - NEW SHAN PROPOSAL
TAGS: SNAR, EAID, BM, TH, US, (COWELL)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006